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                               NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-3411
________________
HAROLD HUNT,
             Appellant
 
    v.
                                               
PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; JAMES PRICE;
ALLADIN SYED; DR. LATIMORE; PAUL A. NOEL;
DR. SKWIVANSKI; DR. STEVENS; FRED POLANDO;
PHS/EMSA; STEPHANIE WOOD; PHILIP L. JOHNSON;
JOAN DELIE; JEFFREY BEARD; EDWARD SWIERCZEWSKI;
DR. BANDY; DR. WHITE; DIANE MANSON
                                               ____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-00277)
District Judge: Honorable William L. Standish
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
JANUARY 24, 2006
Before:    MCKEE, FUENTES AND NYGAARD,  Circuit Judges.
(Filed:  March 17, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Harold Hunt appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint as barred
by the statute of limitations.  For reasons that follow, we will vacate the judgment of the
     1 Although it is perhaps implicit in his earlier filings, Hunt does not appear to have
expressly stated that January 12, 2001, was his release date until he filed his objections to
the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.
2
District Court and remand for further proceedings.
I
On January 10, 2003, Hunt filed a summary complaint alleging that the defendants
conspired to deny or interfere with his medical treatment while he was a state prisoner. 
(At the time he filed his complaint, Hunt was no longer a prisoner.)  In response to the
defendants’ motion for a more definite statement, Hunt set forth a series of medical
complaints beginning “about June, 1997.”  Most important for present purposes, in ¶ 8 he
states: “After INH medication was stopped aweek [sic] before the time of completion,
plaintiff seeked [sic] treatment for hepatitis C, and was denied by all doctors . . . which
continued from 1997 to January 8, 2001.” 
Certain of the defendants responded with a motion to dismiss the complaint
because, inter alia, it is facially apparent from ¶ 8 that Hunt’s complaint was filed two
days late under the pertinent two-year statute of limitations.  In his brief in opposition
Hunt retorted that “the facts in this case  . . . continued to January 12, 2001,” not January
8, and that the defendants’ actions “constitute a continuing and on-going wrong/ and
wrongs . . . .” which continued until his release (on January 121).  Hunt then filed a
motion to amend his complaint, which the court granted.  In his amended complaint Hunt
described his claims in further detail, but provided no specific date later than December 8,
     2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review is plenary.  Evancho v.
Fisher, 423 F.3d 347 (3d Cir. 2005).
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2000.  He also complained, however, that mistreatment continued until his release.  The
defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for essentially the same reasons as
before.
The Magistrate Judge found in favor of the defendants, deeming Hunt’s changing
January 8, 2001, to January 12, 2001, “a transparent attempt to avoid the statute of
limitations.”  Moreover, the Magistrate Judge found the amended complaint untimely
even with regard to January 12, 2001, because it was not filed until August 2004 and
because the allegations concerning the period between January 10 and January 12 do not
relate back.  He also concluded that the “continuing violations” doctrine does not apply
because the amended complaint was not filed within two years of January 12, 2001.  Over
Hunt’s objections the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation, dismissed Hunt’s complaint as to all the defendants, and denied Hunt’s
subsequent motion for reconsideration.  This appeal followed.2
II
A complaint may not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) as untimely under the
relevant statute of limitations unless it is plain from the face of the complaint that it was
not timely filed.  Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 n.1
(3d Cir. 1994).  Hunt’s initial complaint provides no dates at all.  He did not provide the
date on which the defendants based their motion to dismiss – January 8, 2001 – until his
4response to the motion for a more definite statement.  In his reply to the motion to
dismiss, Hunt changed the date to January 12, his release date, and complained that the
defendants’ alleged malfeasance “lasted the entire period until released.”  In his amended
complaint Hunt did not expressly provide any final date for his alleged mistreatment. 
Rather, he stated that he was denied adequate treatment during the period leading up to
his release:
The defendants continued the ongoing denial of necessary diagnosis, follow-up
treatment two weeks before plaintiff went home he was locked up and denied
adequate pain medication.  While locked up . . . plaintiff could not eat could see
just a little, from eye pain, and burning eyes, I was swelled up yet I could not see a
doctor.  Plaintiff’s head was tingling and tight and a very loud ringing in the ears. 
I was confused and could barely think straight or walk straight plaintiff was forced
to walk to a bus stop where it took plaintiff almost 45 minutes to walk 2 blocks to
a bus stop, I had trouble communicating with the bus driver.  I thought I would fall
out at any time.
Amended complaint at ¶ 41. 
In other words, it does not clearly appear on the face of Hunt’s amended complaint
that his action is barred by the statute of limitations.  To reach the conclusion that it was,
the Magistrate Judge relied chiefly on two reasons.  The first required him to look beyond
the face of Hunt’s pleadings and find that changing the date to January 12 was “a
transparent attempt to avoid the statute of limitations.”  R&R at 2.  This finding has at
least two flaws.  First, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court “accept[s] all facts pleaded
as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”  Oshiver, 38 F.3d at
1384.  Second, it is not at all obvious that Hunt was acting in bad faith to avoid the statute
of limitations.  The thrust of Hunt’s pleadings is that he was provided inadequate medical
     3 Although it make no practical difference, we note that Hunt alleged January 12,
2001, in his May 2004 response to the motion to dismiss, not in his amended complaint.
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treatment throughout his period of incarceration, and his argument that he was confused
and mistook the date of his discharge is neither false on its face nor inherently
implausible. Yet unless Hunt was discharged more than two years before he filed his
complaint, the complaint was not, on its face, untimely filed.  Hunt’s pleadings are hardly
models of lucidity, and it does not comport with the leeway owed to pro se litigants to
hold him to the earlier of two (or more) dates in his filings in order to find his complaint
untimely. 
The second major reason relied on by the Magistrate Judge is that even if January
12, 2001, is accepted as the pertinent date, it is of no avail because Hunt did not allege
that date until he filed his amended complaint in August 2004, i.e., more than three and a
half years after January 12, 2001.3  Although this would not matter if the amended
complaint related back, the Magistrate Judge implicitly concluded that it did not, citing
cases for the familiar proposition that relation back is precluded when “new or distinct
conduct, transactions, or occurrences are alleged as grounds for recovery.”  R&R at 3. 
However, the Magistrate Judge provides no support for this conclusion.  Hunt
alleges that the defendants engaged in a pattern of continuing behavior, which began in
1997 and lasted until his release.  When altering the date to January 12 in his response to
the motion to dismiss, Hunt does not appear to have  added any new claims or to describe
significantly different untreated symptoms (even if the amended complaint added new
     4 The Magistrate Judge also rejected Hunt’s invocation of the continuing violation
doctrine because the amended complaint “was not filed within two years of the last
tortious act.” R&R at 4.  In light of our reasons for vacating the judgment of the District
Court we need not decide whether the continuing violation doctrine applies.
     5 We note that our holding in this case is narrow and does not amount to a finding that
Hunt’s complaint was timely filed.  We express no opinion as to whether a statute of
limitations defense is viable in this case with regard to any or all of Hunt’s claims,
whether there are other grounds for dismissing the complaint as to any or all of the
defendants, or whether any of Hunt’s claims have merit.
claims as well as fleshing out his previously stated claims, that would not warrant
dismissing the entire complaint as time-barred).4
For these reasons, we conclude that the District Court erred in dismissing the
complaint as untimely under Rule 12(b)(6).  Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of
the District Court and remand the matter for further proceedings.5  
